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Such exponents of the theory of China's inevitable subjugation form the socialbasis of the tendency to compromise. They are to be found everywhere in China,and therefore the problem of compromise is liable to crop up within theanti-Japanese front at any time and will probably remain with us right untilthe end of the war. Now that Hsuchow has fallen and Wuhan is in danger, itwill not be unprofitable, I think, to knock the bottom out of the theoryof national subjugation.4. During these ten months of war all kinds of views which are indicativeof impetuosity have also appeared. For instance, at the outset of the warmany people were groundlessly optimistic, underestimating Japan and evenbelieving that the Japanese could not get as far as Shansi. Some belittledthe strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance and doubtedthe proposition, "With regard to the whole, mobile warfare is primary andguerrilla warfare supplementary; with regard to the parts, guerrilla warfareis primary and mobile warfare supplementary." They disagreed with the EighthRoute Army's strategy, "Guerrilla warfare is basic, but lose no chance formobile warfare under favourable conditions", which they regarded as a"mechanical" approach.[2] During the battle ofShanghai some people said: "If we can fight for just three months, theinternational situation is bound to change, the Soviet Union is bound tosend troops, and the war will be over." They pinned their hopes for the futureof the War of Resistance chiefly on foreignaid.[3] After the Taierhchuangvictory,[4] some people maintained that the Hsuchowcampaign should be fought as a "quasi-decisive campaign" and that the policyof protracted war should be changed. They said such things as, "This campaignmarks the last desperate struggle of the enemy," or, "If we win, the Japanesewarlords will be demoralized and able only to await their Day ofJudgement."[5] The victory at Pinghsingkuan turnedsome people's heads, and further victory at Taierhchuang has turned morepeople's heads. Doubts have arisen as to whether the enemy will attack Wuhan.Many people think "probably not", and many others "definitely not". Suchdoubts may affect all major issues. For instance, is our anti-Japanese strengthalready sufficient? Some people may answer affirmatively, for our presentstrength is already sufficient to check the enemy's advance, so why increaseit? Or, for instance, is the slogan "Consolidate and expand the Anti-JapaneseNational United Front" still correct? Some people may answer negatively,for the united front in its present state is already strong enough to repulsethe enemy, so why consolidate and expand it? Or, for instance, should ourefforts in diplomacy and international propaganda be intensified? Here againthe answer may be in the negative. Or, for instance, should we proceed inearnest to reform the army system and the system of government, develop themass movement, enforce education for national defence, suppress traitorsand Trotskyites, develop war industries and improve the people's livelihood?Or, for instance, are the slogans calling for the defence of Wuhan, of Cantonand of the Northwest and for the vigorous development of guerrilla warfarein the enemy's rear still correct? The answers might all be in the negative.There are even some people who, the moment a slightly favourable turn occursin the war situation, are prepared to intensify the "friction" between theKuomintang and the Communist Party, diverting attention from external tointernal matters. This almost invariably occurs whenever a comparativelybig battle is won or the enemy's advance comes to a temporary halt. All theabove can be termed political and military short-sightedness. Such talk,however plausible, is actually specious and groundless. To sweep away suchverbiage should help the victorious prosecution of the War of Resistance.5. The question now is: Will China be subjugated? The answer is, No,she will not be subjugated, but will win final victory. Can China win quickly?The answer is, No, she cannot win quickly, and the War of Resistance willbe a protracted war.6. As early as two years ago, we broadly indicated the main arguments onthese questions. On July 16, 1936, five months before the Sian Incident andtwelve months before the Lukouchiao Incident, in an interview with the Americancorrespondent, Mr. Edgar Snow, I made a general estimate of the situationwith regard to war between China and Japan and advanced various principlesfor winning victory. The following excerpts may serve as a reminder: Question: Under what conditions do you think China can defeat and destroy the forces of Japan? Answer: Three conditions are required: first, the establishment of an anti-Japanese united front in China; second, the formation of an international anti-Japanese united front; third, the rise of the revolutionary movement of the people in Japan and the Japanese colonies. From the standpoint of the Chinese people, the unity of the people of China is the most important of the three conditions. Question: How long do you think such a war would last? Answer: That depends on the strength of China's anti-Japanese united front and many other conditioning factors involving China and Japan. That is to say, apart from China's own strength, which is the main thing, international help to China and the help rendered by the revolution in Japan are also important. If China's anti-Japanese united front is greatly expanded and effectively organized horizontally and vertically, if the necessary help is given to China by those governments and peoples which recognize the Japanese imperialist menace to their own interests and if revolution comes quickly in Japan, the war will speedily be brought to an end and China will speedily win victory. If these conditions are not realized quickly, the war will be prolonged. But in the end, just the same, Japan will certainly be defeated and China will certainly be victorious. Only the sacrifices will be great and there will be a very painful period. Question: What is your opinion of the probable course of development of such a war, politically and militarily? Answer: Japan's continental policy is already fixed, and those who think they can halt the Japanese advance by making compromises with Japan at the expense of more Chinese territory and sovereign rights are indulging in mere fantasy. We definitely know that the lower Yangtse valley and our southern seaports are already included in the continental programme of Japanese imperialism. Moreover, Japan wants to occupy the Philippines, Siam, Indo-China, the Malay Peninsula and the Dutch East Indies in order to cut off other countries from China and monopolize the southwestern Pacific. This is Japan's maritime policy. In such a period, China will undoubtedly be in an extremely difficult position. But the majority of the Chinese people believe that such difficulties can be overcome; only the rich in the big port cities are defeatists because they are afraid of losing their property. Many people think it would be impossible for China to continue the war, once her coastline is blockaded by Japan. This is nonsense. To refute them we need only cite the war history of the Red Army. In the present War of Resistance Against Japan, China's position is much superior to that of the Red Army in the civil war. China is a vast country, and even if Japan should succeed in occupying a section of China with as many as 100 to 200 million people, we would still be far from defeated. We would still have ample strength to fight against Japan, while the Japanese would have to fight defensive battles in their rear throughout the war. The heterogeneity and uneven development of China's economy are rather advantageous in the war of resistance. For example, to sever Shanghai from the rest of China would definitely not be as disastrous to China as would be the severance of New York from the rest of the United States. Even if Japan blockades the Chinese coastline, it is impossible for her to blockade China's Northwest, Southwest and West. Thus, once more the central point of the problem is the unity of the entire Chinese people and the building up of a nation-wide anti-Japanese front. This is what we have long been advocating. Question: If the war drags on for a long time and Japan is not completely defeated, would the Communist Party agree to the negotiation of a peace with Japan and recognize her rule in northeastern China? Answer: No. Like the people of the whole country, the Chinese Communist Party will not allow Japan to retain an inch of Chinese territory. Question: What, in your opinion, should be the main strategy and tactics to be followed in this "war of liberation"? Answer: Our strategy should be to employ our main forces to operate over an extended and fluid front. To achieve success, the Chinese troops must conduct their warfare with a high degree of mobility on extensive battlefields, making swift advances and withdrawals, swift concentrations and dispersals. This means large-scale mobile warfare, and not positional warfare depending exclusively on defence works with deep trenches, high fortresses and successive rows of defensive positions. It does not mean the abandonment of all the vital strategic points, which should be defended by positional warfare as long as profitable. But the pivotal strategy must be mobile warfare. Positional warfare is also necessary, but strategically it is auxiliary and secondary. Geographically the theatre of the war is so vast that it is possible for us to conduct mobile warfare most effectively. In the face of the vigorous actions of our forces, the Japanese army will have to be cautious. Its war-machine is ponderous and slow-moving, with limited efficiency. If we concentrate our forces on a narrow front for a defensive war of attrition, we would be throwing away the advantages of our geography and economic organization and repeating the mistake of Abyssinia. In the early period of the war, we must avoid any major decisive battles, and must first employ mobile warfare gradually to break the morale and combat effectiveness of the enemy troops. Besides employing trained armies to carry on mobile warfare, we must organize great numbers of guerrilla units among the peasants. One should know that the anti-Japanese volunteer units in the three northeastern provinces are only a minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilized from the peasants of the whole country. The Chinese peasants have very great latent power; properly organized and directed, they can keep the Japanese army busy twenty-four hours a day and worry it to death. It must be remembered that the war will be fought in China, that is to say, the Japanese army will be entirely surrounded by the hostile Chinese people, it will be forced to move in all its provisions and guard them, it must use large numbers of troops to protect its lines of communications and constantly guard against attacks and it needs large forces to garrison Manchuria and Japan as well. In the course of the war, China will be able to capture many Japanese soldiers and seize many weapons and munitions with which to arm herself; at the same time China will win foreign aid to reinforce the equipment of her troops gradually. Therefore China will be able to conduct positional warfare in the latter period of the war and make positional attacks on the Japanese-occupied areas. Thus Japan's economy will crack under the strain of China's long resistance and the morale of the Japanese forces will break under the trial of innumerable battles. On the Chinese side, however, the growing latent power of resistance will be constantly brought into play and large numbers of revolutionary people will be pouring into the front lines to fight for their freedom. The combination of all these and other factors will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on the fortifications and bases in the Japanese-occupied areas and drive the Japanese forces of aggression out of China.

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